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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

TERRELL W. GUIFF,
Supreme Court No. 910114

Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs .
GINA TAYLOR,

Priority No. 16

Defendant/Appellant.
APPELLEE'S RESPONSIVE BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On January

24, 1990, Janet Guiff,

intestate. Plaintiff/Appellee

a Utah resident, died

is the surviving spouse of Janet

Guiff, who is also survived by a son whose whereabouts are unknown
to

either

party.

Defendant/Appellant

is

the

sister

of

the

deceased, Janet Guiff. (See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
law, hereinafter designated "FFCL, p.2)
On the date of Janet Guiff's death, plaintiff was in lawful
possession of

certain

jewelry

and personal

decedent and located in plaintiff's home.

property

owned

by

About two weeks after

his wife's funeral, plaintiff gave defendant a key to his home and
told defendant she could remove and keep the decedent's clothing.
("FFCL" pp.2-4.)
On July 24, 1990, Plaintiff/Appellee filed a complaint
for conversion and replevin of the jewelry and requested attorney's
fees, costs and punitive damages.

Both parties filed and answered

interrogatories without objection or request for a more definite
answer.

Defendant swore in an affidavit and testified at trial that
plaintiff invited her to his home after his wife's death, was
present when she found the decedent's jewelry in a purse, and gave
the jewelry to her. Defendant testified that after plaintiff had
given her decedent's jewelry, he asked her to have sex with him;
when she refused, he demanded the jewelry back, (See Defendant's
August 1, 1990, affidavit, p.2; TR 18-20, 25-29, 33-34.)
The trial court found defendant entered plaintiff's home,
unlawfully removed and converted decedent's jewelry, specifically
set forth in the court's ruling on valuations, and that plaintiff
did not make a gift of any portion <?f his wife's jewelry or assist
or participate in defendant's taking, conversion and sale of the
jewelry.

("FFCL" pp. 3-4.)

Moreover,

the trial

judge

found

defendant's testimony perjurious, completely lacking in credibility
and

ruled:

"That

the conduct

of defendant, Tina

Taylor, was

unlawful, knowing, and intentional, and in addition thereto, said
Tina Taylor at the time of trial falsely testified about the taking
conversion of the jewelry and further falsely testified about the
number of items taken from plaintiff's home." ("FFCL" p. 4.)
On February 7, 1991, defendant's motion for a new trial was
denied. As noted by "appellant (Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 6 ) , in
his denial of defendant's motion for a new trial, the trial judge
stated the following: "In fact, the Court did not state it was
finding by a preponderance of the evidence.

In this case, the

evidence was so one sided that the Court could have found the
evidence against the defendant, Gina Taylor, beyond all reasonable

doubt."
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW
TRIAL WAS CORRECT
The "key" issue appellant raises on appeal is not the trial
court's failure to grant his motion for a new trial, but counsel's
own failure to question his client prior to trial.
Appellant's remedy for defective discovery, if any, is either
to

follow

the

procedures

set

forth

in

Utah

Rules

of

Civil

Procedure, Rule 33, subsection (a), and move the trial court for an
order to compel discovery, under Rule 37, subsection

(a), with

respect to any failure to answer interrogatories, or move the trial
court

to order

sanctions, under Rule

26, subsection

(g) , for

unsigned answers, (Kusy v. K Mart Apparel, (Utah 1984) 681 P.2d
232; WW & WB Gardner Ins. v. Park W. Village, (Utah 1977) 568 P. 2d
734.)
Appellant complains on appeal that the following answer to his
interrogatory:
"5.
Did you hand over the jewelry of Janet Guiff to
defendant, Tina Taylor? If not, explant (sic) how she got
it?" "ANSWER: No. Plaintiff understands that defendant, Tina
Taylor removed said property from the home of plaintiff and
Janet Guiff, but without authorization of either party."
is "a total and deceptive
buttress

failure

to answer" and attempts to

this spurious argument on his claim

that plaintiff's

explanation of how defendant got into his home was the "key" to his

case (Appellant's Opening Brief, hereinafter designated "AOB", pp.
7-9) .
Defendant's particular method of entering plaintiff's home had
marginal, if any, relevance to the issues at trial.
claims

that:

"(i)n

preparation

for

trial

counsel

Appellant
questioned

defendant extensively about how she could have possibly got the
jewelry out of plaintiff's residence without his knowledge because
plaintiff did not have a reasonable explanation on this point.
Defendant did not tell her counsel about the key, and her counsel
never asked her about the keys." (AOB p. 9.)

However, plaintiff's

consent for defendant to enter his home and remove the decedent's
clothing

was

testimony

never

disputed.

It

was

defendant's

that plaintiff gave her his deceased

perjurious

wife's

jewelry

shortly after the funeral in exchange for sex and fraud as to the
items and value of the jewelry that rightly incensed the trial
court.

The trial judge awarded punitive damages and found that

"... the evidence was so one sided that the court could have found
the

evidence

against

the

defendant, Gina

Taylor, beyond

all

reasonable doubt."
It is well-established that sanctions may lie for any alleged
failure

to

answer

interrogatories

(WR

Skousen

Contractors

v.

Chatter, (Ariz. 1975) 536 P.2d 722; Moses v. Moses, (Colo. 1973)
505 P.2d 1302), to sign answers to interrogatories (Kusy v. K Mart
Apparel, (Utah 1984) 681 P. 2d 1232) or to produce documents for
inspection (WW & WB Gardner v. Park West Village, (Utah 1977) 568
P.2d 734), are vested with trial court, which is given a wide

latitude of discretionary power. (See also G.M. Leasing Corp. v.
Murray Thrift, (Utah 1975) 567 P.2d 179, 180; Jensen v. Baughman,
(Utah 1977) 563 P.2d 179; Tucker Realty v. Kennecott Copper Corp.,
(Utah 1972) 495 P.2d 1254.

Defendant raised this issue of the

alleged defective answer in his motion for a new trial which was
denied on February 7, 1991.
Any

error

in

plaintiff's

failure

to explicitly

describe

defendant's entry into his home, assuming he had knowledge of how
she entered his home, and further assuming

the fact was even

relevant, was either waived by defendant's failure to object and/or
request sanctions at trial, or was determined by the trial court to
be invited, harmless and inconsequential error.

Appellant had

ample opportunity, even during trial, to object to what he claims
now was a "defective answer."

Appellants counsel is certainly

charged with knowledge of appellant.
his own client as to how she entered

Counsel's failure to query
the house should not be

ascribed as some deceitful answer by plaintiff to somehow dignify
an otherwise irrelevant issue into grounds for an appeal.
POINT II
THE FINDINGS OF FACT WERE SUPPORTED
BY THE EVIDENCE AND WERE WELL WITHIN
THE TRIAL COURTS DISCRETION
Appellant concedes that findings by the trial court will not
be set aside on appeal unless "clearly erroneous." Appellant cites
Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896 (Utah 1989) for the
proposition that any finding by the trial court must be articulated
with detail sufficient to permit review by a court of appeal.

The

court in Reid noted:
"To mount a successful challenge to the correctness of a trial
court's findings of fact, an appellant must first marshal
the evidence supporting the finding and then demonstrate that
the evidence is legally insufficient to support the findings
even in viewing in the light most favorable to the court
below, (cites omitted) The legal sufficiency of the evidence
is determined by the standard set out in civil rule 52(a),
which provides: "Findings of fact, whether based on oral or
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of
the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses."
Also see Butler v. Lee, 774 P.2d 1150 (Utah 1989).
As appellant notes in her brief, the trial court in this case
made

appropriate

valuations

from

plaintiff's

testimony,

miscellaneous documents, receipts and other papers. The court made
a specific ruling on valuation of the items appellant complains of
on December 12, 1990 and set forth valid reasons therefore.

Such

ruling was supported by the evidence and explained by the court.
Other than dissatisfaction, appellant fails to demonstrate that the
valuations were not supported by the evidence, that they were
clearly erroneous, or that the court abused its discretion in
finding that appellant lied.

Accordingly, there exists more than

an ample basis for the court's findings in this matter.
POINT III.
PUNITIVE DAMAGES ARE APPROPRIATE
AND CERTAINLY NOT EXCESSIVE IN THIS MATTER.
The trial court found appellant liable for an intentional tort
of conversion
falsely

of

testified

property of appellee and in addition thereto,
about

property converted.

the conversion

The court found

and

the extent of

that appellant

the

converted

property in an amount of $7,598.00 and awarded punitive damages in

an amount

of

$3,000.00.

Such

an award

is

within

the

sound

discretion of the trial court and is certainly not disproportionate
to the injury and actual damage.
Appellant further complains that the burden of proof required
for

an

award

of

punitive

damages

is

wrong.

Regardless

of

appellant's opinion, the law is clear and the court followed the
law as it is obliged to do.
POINT IV.
PLAINTIFF COULD NOT HAVE JOINED
AN UNAVAILABLE PARTY
Appellant

argues

that

plaintiff

was required

to

join

an

unavailable party and that his failure to do so deprived him of
standing.

Such an argument presumes several factors not in issue

in this case, but fundamentally assumes that plaintiff could have
joined another party.

As appellant is fully aware, said party

could

at

not

be

located

jurisdiction of the court.
sufficiently egregious

all, much

less

brought

within

the

Appellant's conduct in this matter was

that to suggest

to this court

that she

should be exonerated or entitled to another trial because there may
be another victim who can't be located,

is contrary to sound

judicial policy and good reason.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the trial court's decision in
this matter should be affirmed in all respects and appellee should
be awarded his costs and attorneys fees in having to respond to
this appeal.
DATED this

5rd

day of

September

^

iggi>

DAVID J, KNOW;
Attorney fo^Appellee
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4

Brief of Appellee upon iMr. Larrie A.
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